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BIG (GAY) LOVE: HAS THE IRS LEGALIZED
POLYGAMY?
ANTHONY C. INFANTI**

If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual
[gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy,
you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you
have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything.
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INTRODUCTION

Bigamy and polygamy are perennial participants in the parade of
horribles organized by opponents of LGBT rights.2 To halt this
parade, LGBT rights supporters argue that same-sex marriage is
different from-and will not lead to-plural marriage. The purpose
of this advocacy is to open the door to marriage just enough to allow
same-sex couples to enter-and then to quickly close the door before
any of the participants in the parade of horribles can slip in behind
them. Notwithstanding their efforts, it seems that LGBT rights
supporters inadvertently left the door open just a crack.
If some commentators are correct, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) may have unwittingly recognized plural marriage in its initial
guidance4 implementing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Windsor,5 which struck down section three of the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).6 According to these
commentators, the IRS will now recognize any same-sex marriage
that complies with the legal formalities of a state that permits samesex couples to marry, regardless of its validity in the couple's state of
domicile. This interpretation put a foot in the door to marriage,
swinging the door back open and creating the possibility of dual status
marriages-that is, ones that are invalid under state law but

2. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Liberty Counsel in Support of Respondent
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives (Merits Brief) at
45, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390994, at *45;
Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of Respondent
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Addressing the Merits, and Supporting Reversal at 13
14, 20, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 1780814, at *13 14, 20.
3. E.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and
Bargainingfor Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958 n.8, 1979 86 (2010); Jeffery L.
Bineham, Marriage Equality Is Not a Slippery Slope, MINNPOST (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/10/marriage-equality-not-slippery-slope;
William Saletan, Don't Do Unto Others: The Difference Between Gay Marriage and
Polygamy, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2006, 12:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health and
science/human nature/2006/03/dont do unto others.html; see also Would Gay Marriage
Lead to Polygamy?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 31, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org
/2012/05/31/154064922/would-gay-marriage-lead-to-legal-polygamy.
"Plural marriage," like "polygamy," is a "gender-neutral term for marriages with
multiple spouses, regardless of the gender combination." Davis, supra note 3, at 1966.
Because the term "plural marriage" covers marriages to multiple spouses without
reference to a specific number, I use it here as embracing both bigamy and polygamy.
4. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
5. 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
6. Id. at 2696.
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recognized for federal tax purposes-and thus to the potential
recognition of plural marriage under the federal tax laws.
This essay builds upon my earlier work analyzing the
shortcomings of the IRS's implementation of the Windsor decision.7
The Secretary of the Treasury promised that Revenue Ruling 2013-17
would provide "certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance" for
same-sex couples.8 To the contrary, I have explained that the ruling
"provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA did,
as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the
unwary, creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully,
unintended) consequences." 9 Given the impossibility of finding a fair
and workable solution for addressing the tax treatment of same-sex
couples until same-sex marriage is recognized in every state, I have
argued that the time is ripe to reconsider proposals to abandon the
treatment of the married couple as a taxable unit in favor of an
individual tax return filing system that recognizes and values all
personal relationships." In this essay, I extend that analysis by
explaining how ambiguity in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 opens the door
to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes-a result that
is as problematic as it is (in all likelihood) unintended.
The remainder of this essay is divided into four parts. Part I
summarizes the relevant section of Revenue Ruling 2013-17,
explaining both my own interpretation of it and reaction to that
interpretation (what I will refer to as the "alternative
interpretation"). It is the alternative interpretation of the ruling that
opens the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax
purposes. Part II explains how a subset of marriages that would be
recognized for federal tax purposes under the alternative
interpretation would be void under state law (until such time as the
relevant state-level defense of marriage act is repealed or ruled
unconstitutional), creating the possibility that taxpayers might (either
purposefully or inadvertently) enter into plural marriages that are all
recognized for federal tax purposes even though they are all invalid
7. Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of Tax Equality, 108 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY
110
(2013),
http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2013/10/themoonscape-of-tax-equality.html.
8. Annie Lowrey, IRS to Recognize Gay Couples, Regardless of State Measures,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2013, at A6 (quoting Treasury Secretary Jacob
Lew) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9. Infanti, supra note 7, at 118.
10. Id. at 128 29.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 (2014)

4

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

under state law (and therefore avoid state criminal prohibitions
against plural marriage). Part III dissects the flaws in the alternative
interpretation. It explains why the alternative interpretation is
unlikely to withstand scrutiny when challenged and how the
inevitable challenges will only exacerbate the uncertainty that
continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex couples postWindsor. The essay then closes with brief concluding remarks.
I. REVENUE RULING 2013-17

From 1996 until 2013, section three of DOMA provided that, for
purposes of federal law, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife."" The practical effect of this provision was to treat
same-sex couples as legal strangers under federal law, even if they
were treated as married under state law. For example, for federal tax
purposes, same-sex couples who were married under state law (or
who had entered into legally equivalent civil unions or domestic
partnerships) were prohibited from filing joint federal income tax
returns, 2 from transferring property to each other free of tax, 3 and
from excluding from gross income the value of fringe benefits
provided to a spouse. 4
On June 26, 2013, a sharply divided Supreme Court invalidated
section three of DOMA. 5 The Court held that section three "is
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect
to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity."'1 6 Following this
decision, the federal government scrambled to issue guidance to

11. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2695 96 (2013).
12. I.R.C. § 6013 (2012).
13. Id. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523.
14. E.g., id. §§ 105(b), 106, 132(h)(1) (2), 132(j)(4), 132(m)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1

(1960). An employee's same-sex partner who also qualified as the employee's dependent
did qualify for an exclusion from gross income for certain but not all-of these fringe
benefits. Compare I.R.C. §§ 132(h)(1) (2), 132(j)(4) (including only dependent children),

with I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106; Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, 72 Fed. Reg.
46,421 (Aug. 20, 2007) (together covering any qualifying dependent).
15. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (invalidating section three
of DOMA).
16. Id. at 2696.
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married same-sex couples on the application of federal law to their
relationships. 7 Departing from its past practice of issuing to same-sex
couples only guidance with no precedential value, 8 the IRS issued its
first piece of guidance in the form of a revenue ruling.' 9 The IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17 on August 29, 2013, with an effective
date of September 16, 2013.20
Among other things, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 purports to
address the tax issues that mobile same-sex couples face as they
grapple with a confusing patchwork of state laws governing
relationship recognition. 2' As of this writing, states can be divided
into four distinct (and sometimes overlapping) categories with regard
to the legal treatment of same-sex couples: (1) those that permit
same-sex marriage (e.g., the District of Columbia, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
and Washington), (2) those that recognize legally equivalent
relationships (i.e., civil unions or domestic partnerships) (e.g., Nevada
and the District of Columbia, which is also a jurisdiction that permits
same-sex couples to marry), (3) those that recognize legal
17. E.g., Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec'y of Def. to Sec'ys of the Military
Dep'ts Under Sec'y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness (Aug. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/docs/Extending-Benefits-to-Same-SexSpouses-of-Military-Members.pdf; U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Benefits Admin. Letter No.
13-203, Coverage of Same-Sex Spouses 1, 2 (July 17, 2013), available at
http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/benefits-administrationletters/2013/13-203.pdf.
18. Past guidance has generally taken the form of private letter rulings and chief
counsel memoranda, both of which are prohibited by law from being cited as precedent.
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3); see infra note 19.
19. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1987) ("Revenue Rulings
... are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and
may be cited and relied upon for that purpose."); Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers:A
Collision of "Others," 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 19 (2012) (describing the history of
providing nonprecedential guidance).
20. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 J.R.B. 201,204; I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-72 (Aug.
29, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Treasury-and-IRS-Announce-That-All-Legal
-Same-Sex-Marriages-Will-Be-Recognized-For-Federal-Tax-Purposes %3B-RulingProvides-Certainty,-Benefits-and-Protections-Under-Federa-Tax-Law-for-Same-SexMarried-Couples. The IRS will permit taxpayers to apply the revenue ruling retroactively
in some circumstances. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204.
21. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202 ("There are more than two
hundred Code provisions and Treasury regulations relating to the internal revenue laws
that include the terms 'spouse,' 'marriage' (and derivatives thereof, such as 'marries' and
,married'), 'husband and wife,' 'husband,' and 'wife.' ").
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relationships with more limited rights and obligations as compared to
marriage (e.g., Colorado and Wisconsin), and (4) those that refuse to
legally recognize same-sex marriages (e.g., Georgia, Louisiana, Texas,
and West Virginia-notably, Nevada, Colorado, and Wisconsin also
fall into this category even though they afford some alternative form
of legal recognition to same-sex relationships). As they live in, move
among, and travel between these states, married same-sex couples can
divide their relationships into four distinct (and sometimes
overlapping) categories:
" Evasive marriages. A marriage is evasive when a couple
travels out of state to marry in order to "evade" a marriage
prohibition in their home state. For example, a West Virginia
same-sex couple might go to Maryland to marry, returning
home to West Virginia after the wedding. This is an evasive
marriage because the couple's reason for traveling to
Maryland was to avoid West Virginia's ban on same-sex
marriages. 23
" Migratory marriages. A marriage is migratory when a couple
lives and marries in one state but later moves to another. For
example, a same-sex couple might live and marry in
Massachusetts, but years later move to Louisiana (i.e., they
"migrated" from Massachusetts to Louisiana).2 4
" Visitor marriages. A marriage is a visitor marriage when the
couple is married and lives in one state but travels through
22. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other Relationship Recognition
Laws (2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/
marriage-equality 10-2014.pdf; Human Rights Campaign, Statewide MarriageProhibitions
(2014),
http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-l.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/
marriage-prohibitions 6-10-2014.pdf. In contrast to the Human Rights Campaign, I would
not classify Colorado as a state that provides a full legal equivalent to marriage because
Colorado prohibits same-sex couples who have entered only into civil unions from filing
joint state income tax returns. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-117 (2014) (requiring
couples in civil unions to use the same filing status for state purposes as they use for
federal purposes); COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-2:39-22-104(1.7) (2014) (requiring state filing
status to track federal filing status, effectively permitting same-sex couples married outside
of Colorado but living there to file joint state income tax returns); see also Rev. Rul. 201317, § 4, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204 (refusing to recognize civil unions for federal tax purposes).
23. ANDREw KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 100 02 (2006).

24. Id.
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another state. For example, the migratory same-sex couple
from Massachusetts described in the previous paragraph
would be in a visitor marriage while driving through the states
that lie in between Massachusetts and Louisiana on the way to
their new home.
Extraterritorialmarriages. A marriage is extraterritorial when
the marital status of a couple married and living in one state is
relevant under the law of another state even though they have
not actually lived or traveled there. For example, returning to
the example of the Massachusetts same-sex couple above,
their marriage would be extraterritorial if they engaged in a
transaction in Texas by mail or over the Internet and their
marital status was somehow relevant to the transaction, but
they never physically lived in or visited Texas.26
In an effort to dodge the complex and thorny issues created
when mobility intersects with the patchwork of state relationship
recognition laws, the IRS stated in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that it
"has determined to interpret the [Internal Revenue] Code [(Code)] as
incorporating a general rule, for Federal tax purposes, that recognizes
the validity of a same-sex marriage that was valid in the state where it
was entered into, regardless of the married couple's place of
domicile." '27 This statement seems simple and clear on its face;
however, based on the explanation and justification of this position,
the IRS appears to have had in mind only one of the four different
categories of marriages described above. The IRS seems to have
considered only the plight of same-sex couples in migratory
marriages-that is, the IRS was concerned only with couples who
lived and married in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage and
who later moved to a state that refuses to recognize same-sex
marriages. The IRS did not explicitly consider or address the legal
situation faced by same-sex couples in evasive, visitor, or
extraterritorial marriages.28
25. Id. at 101 02.
26. Id. at 102.
27. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203.
28. Even for those in migratory marriages, the IRS only addressed the situation where
marital status is made directly relevant by the Code (i.e., situations where the Code
directly refers to a taxpayer being "married" or a "spouse"). Id. As I have explained
elsewhere, the IRS did not address the choice-of-law questions that arise when marital
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This inference finds support in the IRS's assertion that its
interpretation in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is "[c]onsistent with the
longstanding position expressed in Revenue Ruling 58-66. " 29 Revenue
Ruling 58-66 conveyed the IRS's position regarding common-law
marriages, which, like same-sex marriages, are recognized in some
states but not others. In Revenue Ruling 58-66, the IRS stated that it
would recognize common-law marriages entered into in states
recognizing those relationships and would continue to recognize those
marriages in the case of taxpayers who enter into a "common-law
marriage in a state which recognizes such relationships and who later
move into a state in which a ceremony is required to initiate the marital
relationship. '3' As described above, this is the very definition of a
migratory marriage. In keeping with this focus on migratory
marriages, the IRS recapitulated its position in Revenue Ruling 201317 regarding same-sex marriage as fitting neatly within the framework
of Revenue Ruling 58-66: "For over half a century, for Federal
income tax purposes, the [IRS] has recognized marriages based on the
laws of the state in which they were entered into, without regard to
subsequent changes in domicile, to achieve uniformity, stability, and
efficiency in the application and administration of the Code. ' ' 3' The
paragraphs following this recapitulation "reinforce the impression
that the IRS only had migratory marriages in mind when it drafted
the revenue ruling, as these paragraphs focus exclusively on the
advantages of a uniform approach when couples change their
domicile by moving from state to state. "32
Of particular relevance to this essay, Revenue Ruling 2013-17
leaves evasive marriages (i.e., where a same-sex couple marries
outside of their home state to evade a same-sex marriage ban)
entirely unaddressed. Other commentators disagree with this
interpretation-notably, without engaging the text of the revenue
ruling at all-and maintain that the IRS did intend to cover evasive
marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 33 I encountered a similar
status is indirectly relevant to determining tax consequences for example, where tax
consequences turn on the existence of a parent-child relationship. Infanti, supra note 7, at
120 22.
29. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203.
30. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (emphasis added).
31. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203 (emphasis added).
32. Infanti, supra note 7, at 119.
33. E.g., Patricia A. Cain, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the
Meeting of the Pro Bono & Tax Clinics Committee of the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association (Sept. 21, 2013); Will Baude, Two New Essays on Post-Windsor
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reaction when presenting this idea to others at continuing legal
education programs and when publishing op-ed pieces on the tax
treatment of same-sex couples post-Windsor. Most are incredulous
that the Obama administration would have left out any same-sex
marriages, and, in any event, they doubt that the IRS would audit
same-sex couples who have gone through a marriage ceremony and
claim to be married for federal tax purposes. But what the IRS may
have intended to say-and, interestingly, all of these reactions are
based not on objective evidence of such an intention but on the
individual's projection of what the IRS intended-is not the same as
what the IRS actually said. In addition, as I have explained elsewhere,
those most likely to press the ambiguities in this guidance and to
contest its validity are not IRS agents auditing same-sex couples but
individual lesbian or gay taxpayers who are caught in tax traps that
the IRS laid in Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 34
Even assuming that the IRS did intend to cover evasive same-sex
marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, there is still an open choice-oflaw question regarding whether, in the words of the ruling, each of
these evasive marriages "was valid in the state where it was entered
into," because only same-sex marriages meeting this requirement will
be recognized for federal tax purposes. 35 The answer to this question
will depend on whether the validity of the marriage is determined
under the law of the place of the marriage's celebration (which does
recognize same-sex marriage) or under the law of the couple's
domicile (which does not). 36 As I will show in Part II below, this
Choice-of-Law Questions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 18, 2013, 11:24 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/18/two-new-essays-post-windsor-choice-law-questions/.
34. Infanti, supra note 7, at 122 25.
35. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 J.R.B. 201, 203.
36. In one case, these two may actually be the same state. Same-sex marriages
celebrated in Utah in the interval between a U.S. federal district court decision striking
down the state's prohibition against same-sex marriage and the U.S. Supreme Court's
issuance of a stay of that ruling pending appeal will be legally recognized for federal tax
purposes but are not legally recognized in Utah. Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, U.S. to
Recognize 1,300 Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/us/politics/same-sex-marriage-utah.html? r 0.
Utah
does not consider these marriages void but refuses to legally recognize them for most
purposes. See Evans v. Utah, No. 2:14CV55DAK, 2014 WL 2048343, at *4 (D. Utah May
19, 2014). As described in the text below, this distinction can make a difference in the
evasive marriage situation, but would not necessarily rule out the possibility of plural
marriage-though criminal prohibitions against bigamy may be a hurdle. See infra note 79.
Nevertheless, the State of Utah is currently embroiled in litigation in federal court over
whether it may refuse legal recognition to these marriages. Evans, 2014 WL 2048343, at
*20 (preliminarily enjoining Utah from enforcing its state ban against these marriages);
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answer raises the possibility that the IRS might have unwittingly
recognized plural marriage under Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 37
In considering whether evasive same-sex marriages are "valid"
and thus recognized for federal tax purposes, the conventional choiceof-law rules found in the Restatement (First)and (Second) of Conflict
of Laws might very well result in a court's decision to ignore the law
of the place of celebration and instead to defer to the law of the samesex couple's domicile-that is, to the law of the state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage.38 Applying these rules, if the evasive
marriage "violates the strong public policy" of the couple's state of
domicile or is declared "void" by that state, then the marriage is
invalid and should not be recognized for federal tax purposes under
Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 39 Again, without engaging the text of the
ruling or considering collateral consequences, other commentators
have argued that Revenue Ruling 2013-17 completely disregards the
law of the couple's domicile and requires only that the marriage be
permitted under the laws of the place of celebration (for the
Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65, 2014 WL 3557112, at *20 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (granting a
stay of this decision pending a final decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit on appeal).
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra note 39; see also Infanti, supra note 7, at 119 20. The Windsor case itself
involved the evasive marriage of a New York couple who went to Canada to be married
and then returned to New York to live. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682
(2013). Importantly, however, the Second Circuit predicted that New York would have
recognized the couple's Canadian marriage and that the couple would, therefore, have
been married at the time of the taxpayer's death (i.e., the relevant time for determining
the availability of the estate tax marital deduction). Id. at 2683; Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169, 177 78 (2d Cir. 2012).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see id. cmt. a
("The rule of this Section is concerned with what law governs the validity of a marriage as
such, namely with what law determines, without regard to any incident involving the
marriage, whether a man and a woman are husband and wife.... [T]he validity of a
marriage as such may be exclusively involved in an action for an annulment, in an action
for a declaratory judgment that a marriage does or does not exist and in a criminal
prosecution for bigamy."); id. ch. 11, intro, note ("[W]hether two persons are validly
married is determined, wherever they may be, by the law governing the marriage (see
§ 283)."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934) ("A marriage
which is against the law of the state of domicil[e] of either party, though the requirements
of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere
in the following cases: ...marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil[e]
makes void even though celebrated in another state."); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith
and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 335
(1997) (stating in reference to the rules in the Restatement (First) and Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws that if "the marriage is obnoxious to an important public
policy of the domicile, then the marriage will not be valid anywhere").
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remainder of this essay, I will refer to this position as the "alternative
interpretation" of Revenue Ruling 2013-17)." 0 Under this alternative
interpretation, all evasive same-sex marriages would be recognized
for federal tax purposes, unless the state of celebration had enacted
an "anti-evasion" statute that invalidated marriages entered into by
couples attempting to evade prohibitions in their home state.4 For
instance, Massachusetts formerly had an anti-evasion statute that
then-Governor Mitt Romney used to prevent some out-of-state samesex couples from marrying in Massachusetts.42 New Hampshire still
has an anti-evasion statute on its books.4 3 In the next section, I will
explore how the alternative interpretation might open the door to
recognizing bigamous and polygamous same-sex marriages under the
federal tax laws.
II. OPENING THE DOOR TO TAX POLYGAMY
The possibility that plural marriages might be recognized for
federal tax purposes is created by the significant gap between what
would be a novel federal standard for validating marriages and a
separate, long-standing state standard for validating marriages. An
example will help to illustrate how this gap between state and federal
law might open the door to plural marriages, and it will also provide a
vehicle for exploring the potential consequences of disconnecting
state and federal law regarding the determination of marital status.
For this purpose, I will use the example of a hypothetical same-sex
couple from Pennsylvania-a state that only began to recognize samesex marriages on May 20, 2014."4 Prior to that date, Pennsylvania was
bordered on three sides by states that permitted same-sex couples to

40. See supra note 33.
41. See supra note 33.
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11 13 (2008), repealed by Act of July 31, 2008, ch.
216, § 1, 2008 Mass. Acts 1014; see Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623,
651 52 (Mass. 2006) (upholding the application of sections 11 13 to nonresident same-sex
couples prior to their repeal).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:44 (2007).
44. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (holding the
Pennsylvania defense of marriage act unconstitutional); Kate Giammarise & Gideon
Bradshaw, No Appeal of Gay Marriage Ruling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 22,
2014,
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2014/05/21/Corbett-won-t-appealruling-to-allow-same-sex-marriage/stories/201405210178
(indicating
that
Governor
Corbett of Pennsylvania decided not to appeal the ruling because of the slim chance of
success on appeal).
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marry45 and was in close proximity to others, which made entering
into evasive marriages relatively easy. Our hypothetical Pennsylvania
couple will be assumed to have traveled to New York to marry in late
2011 and to have returned to Pennsylvania after the wedding to make
their home there.46
This example will allow us to consider both: (1) how the gap
between these federal and state standards for determining the validity
of a marriage would have operated during the time that Pennsylvania
refused to recognize same-sex marriages;47 and (2) the potential
implications following Pennsylvania's recognition of same-sex
marriages for those who might have taken advantage of, or
inadvertently fallen into, this gap. As discussed in Part JJ.D below,
same-sex couples from Pennsylvania who entered into evasive
marriages are not the only ones who might have taken advantage of,
or fallen into, this gap. A similar gap continues to exist between the
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and the
standards for determining the validity of evasive same-sex marriages
under the laws of several other states.48
I will begin the discussion of this example by considering the
legal treatment of the couple's evasive New York marriage prior to
the time when Pennsylvania began to recognize same-sex marriages,
analyzing its legal treatment first for federal tax purposes under the
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and then under
state law. Following that discussion, I will consider the possibility that
either or both members of this couple might have married
additional-or alternative-same-sex partners and have had those
marriages recognized for federal tax purposes, too. I will conclude the
discussion of this example by considering the ramifications on such
plural marriages of the recent federal court decision striking down the
Pennsylvania defense of marriage act as unconstitutional.
45. Prior to Whitewood, same-sex marriage was legally recognized in Delaware,
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and
Other Relationship Recognition Laws (2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/marriage-equality 10-2014.pdf.
46. New York allowed same-sex couples to marry beginning on July 24, 2011.
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 3, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749 50 (McKinney) (codified at
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b, 13 (McKinney 2011)).
47. And, given the IRS's position in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that taxpayers can apply
that ruling retroactively to open taxable years, this period would extend back several years
before the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor. Rev. Rul. 2013-17,
2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204.
48. See infra notes 101 106 and accompanying text.
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Legal Treatment Before the Fall of the State Defense of Marriage
Act
1. Federal Tax Treatment

Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17,
the Pennsylvania couple's New York marriage would be recognized
for federal tax purposes from its inception so long as it was lawful in
New York. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that the marriage
did meet New York's legal requirements, the same-sex couple would
have been treated as married for federal tax purposes from 2011
onward.4 9
2. State Law Treatment
For purposes of determining the validity of an evasive marriage
entered into by Pennsylvania residents, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has adopted and applied section 283 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws."° According to section 283(2) of the
Restatement, "La] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another
state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriageat the time of the marriage.""
In Estate of Lenherr,2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied
this rule in determining whether a decedent's estate was entitled to
the marital exemption under the state inheritance tax. Leo and Sarah
Lenherr had been married for nearly forty years when Leo passed
away. 3 Leo and Sarah had each been married before, and their
former spouses had divorced them on the grounds that they had
committed adultery (with each other).,4 Following their divorces, the
Pennsylvania couple married in West Virginia and returned to

49. Under my interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, whether an evasive marriage
such as this New York marriage is recognized for federal tax purposes would always
depend on whether it is valid under the appropriate state's law, as determined under
relevant choice-of-law rules. Thus, my interpretation of the ruling coincides with the
general treatment of marriage validity under state law, as discussed in Part 11.A.2 infra.
50. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis
added).
52. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974).
53. Id. at 257.
54. Id. at 256 57.
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Pennsylvania to live.55 The question in the case was whether the
couple would be treated as married under Pennsylvania law at Leo's
death, allowing property that was jointly owned by the couple with a
right of survivorship to pass free of inheritance tax to Sarah.56
It was conceded that the couple's marriage was valid under West
Virginia law.5" However, the couple had married in West Virginia to
avoid a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited a husband or wife who
was guilty of the crime of adultery from marrying " 'the person with
whom the said crime was committed during the life of the former wife
or husband.' "" A separate statute prohibited the issuance of a
marriage license in Pennsylvania to an individual who was divorced
on grounds of adultery and wished to marry the person with whom he
or she had committed adultery. 9 Although Leo and Sarah had been
divorced on grounds of adultery, neither had been convicted of the
crime of adultery.6" Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded that the adjudication of adultery in the context of Leo's
and Sarah's divorces was sufficient to trigger both statutes.6 This set
up a direct conflict between Pennsylvania and West Virginia law and
required the court to decide which state's law would apply for
purposes of determining the validity of the couple's marriage.62
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that there is a strong
policy in favor of uniformity in the recognition of marriages but, at
the same time, observed that each state has the authority to create its
own marriage laws and "those laws and procedures should not be
circumvented by the sham of travelling to a nearby less stringent
jurisdiction.16 3 In applying section 283 of the Restatement, the court
had "no trouble concluding that Pennsylvania has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage."6 4 The only real
question for the court was whether the policy behind the

55. Id. at 257.
56. Id. at 256.

57. Id. at 257.
58. Id. (quoting Act of June 17, 1971, P.L. 169, No. 16, § 1, amending Act of March 13,
1815, P.L. 150, § 9, 48 P.S. § 169 (Supp. 1973 74), repealed by 1972 Pa. Laws, Act No. 334,

§ 5).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 256 57.
61. Id. at 257.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 258.

64. Id.
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Pennsylvania statutes that prohibited the couple's
marriage was "so
65
strong that it must be given extraterritorialeffect.
In considering this question, the court found "that the strength of
the policy behind [the statute] depends to a significant degree upon
the incident of marriage under consideration."66 According to the
court, an incidents-based analysis was appropriate because the
legislature itself had provided that the statutory bar to remarriage by
adulterers would not extend to all incidents of marriage.67 The court
determined that the policy behind the statutory bar was not to
penalize the adulterers but to protect the sensibilities of their former
spouses as well as the "'moral sense of the community."' 6 8 Though the
court admitted that the policy behind the statute might be "quite
strong with respect to cohabitation and many other incidents of
marriage," it concluded that denying the marital exemption from
inheritance tax would neither deter adulterous conduct nor spare the
feelings of the former spouses.6 9 Balancing the "illusory gain" from
enforcing the statutory bar against the purpose of the inheritance tax
exemption to recognize that property held with right of survivorship
is the product of joint effort as well as the policy in favor of
uniformity in the recognition of marriages, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court "decline[d] to apply Pennsylvania law to invalidate this
marriage for this purpose."7°
Applying this analysis to the hypothetical New York marriage
entered into by our Pennsylvania same-sex couple, the Pennsylvania
courts would likely determine that Pennsylvania had the most
significant relationship to the couple at the time of the marriage-a
conclusion that would not only be consistent with Estate of Lenherr
but also with other precedent applying the rule in section 283 of the
Restatement.7 The Restatement also explains that the first step in the
analysis under section 283(2) is to determine whether there is a state
statute that "invalidate[s] in specified circumstances the out-of-state
marriage of local domiciliaries. If the marriage comes within the

65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. Id. The court observed that the statutory bar did not affect the legitimacy of
children. Id.
68. Id. at 259 (quoting In re Stull's Estate, 39 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1898)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 reporter's note to
cmt. k & app. (1971 & Supp. 2013) (collecting relevant precedent).
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provisions of such a statute, it is clear that it would be held invalid in
the state of most significant relationship and the forum will hold it
invalid likewise .... In contrast to the situation in Estate of
Lenherr, where there was no statute that invalidated the marriage and
where it was left to the court to ascertain the policy behind the statute
and the relative strength of that policy, 3 the Pennsylvania General
Assembly was more direct and categorical in both its invalidation of
evasive same-sex marriages and its statement of the strength of the
policy behind that invalidation. Before it was struck down as
unconstitutional, the relevant portion of the Pennsylvania defense of
marriage act read:
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public
policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between
one man and one woman. A marriage between persons of the
same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign
jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in
this Commonwealth. 4
Because the General Assembly declared this category of
marriages "void" and clearly articulated a "strong and longstanding
72. Id. Regarding the potential countervailing considerations that might exist, the
Restatement explains:
The time of the bringing of the action which questions the validity of the marriage
may have an important bearing upon whether a strong policy of the state of most
significant relationship is involved. If the action is brought at a time when both
spouses are still domiciled in that state, the interest of that state in the spouses is
apparent and its strong policy may be involved in the circumstances discussed
above. The situation may well be different, however, if the action involving the
validity of the marriage is brought at a time when both of the spouses have moved
from the state.
Id. (emphasis added). In the situation posited here, where the couple returns to and
remains in Pennsylvania following the New York marriage, these countervailing
considerations would not exist. See id.
73. Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 257, 258-59. Moreover, the Lenherr court's
incidents analysis is not relevant to the instant situation because the General Assembly did
not carve out any incidents of marriage from the statutory prohibition against same-sex
marriage. See infra text accompanying note 744. The question here does not relate to
whether it was inoffensive to treat a couple as married for a discrete purpose under state
law; rather, it is whether the couple was married for all purposes under state law.
Possessing one or more incidents of marriage is not sufficient for a couple to be treated as
married for federal tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 4, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204. It
would be difficult for the IRS to argue otherwise when it refuses to recognize domestic
partnerships and civil unions for federal tax purposes-even if they possess all of the
incidents of marriage. Id.
74. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2013).
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public policy" against same-sex marriage, it appears that an evasive
marriage entered into by a Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have
been held invalid prior to the fall of the state's defense of marriage
act in May 2014. 7"
Furthermore, a void marriage in Pennsylvania is a marriage that
never existed at all-regardless of whether either party to the
marriage ever sought an annulment.76 Indeed, "[i]t has been held that,
as a void marriage is a nullity, the innocent party is free to marry
again without any prior decree of annulment."7 7 Therefore, our
hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have been left with
a marriage that did not exist under state law but that would

75. See In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953) (using the law of the place of
celebration to determine the validity of an evasive marriage of New York residents
because a New York law voiding incestuous marriages did not have specifically
extraterritorial application as the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act did and, under
the circumstances, the natural law exception did not apply); Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d
328, 337-40 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J., concurring) (applying the rule announced in May's
Estate and asserting that evasive same-sex marriages would be recognized in New York
because of the lack of a specific statute voiding out-of-state same-sex marriages and
because the natural law exception does not apply); see also Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 645 (Mass. 2006) (Spina, J., concurring) (deferring to the
"paramount interest" of the state of a couple's domicile in upholding the constitutionality
of a now-repealed reverse evasion statute); KOPPELMAN, supra note 23, at 88 (describing
the Restatement approach and stating that "[t]he disfavored form of marriage could not
validly be celebrated in the forum state, and domiciliaries of the forum could not enter
into that sort of marriage anywhere"); Strasser, supra note 39, at 337 ("Arguably, when a
legislature declares a marriage void rather than merely prohibited, the state demonstrates
that there is a strong public policy against such marriages and that such marriages, even if
validly contracted elsewhere, should not be recognized by the state" (footnotes omitted));
see also supra note 39.
76. See Commonwealth ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 27 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1942); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 563, 576 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Berks County 2010)
(holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex
couple; in dicta, the court, without citing any authority or engaging in any legal analysis,
speculated that an evasive marriage-though void in Pennsylvania might be valid in a
state that recognizes same-sex marriage, but the court later indicated that the same-sex
couple was not left without a remedy because they should have been able to obtain an
annulment from the Pennsylvania courts, see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b) (West
2013)); see also Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1 CA CV 11 0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *2
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 12, 2012) (finding that granting an annulment to a couple who had
entered into an evasive same-sex marriage would be consistent with the marriage's
treatment as void under Arizona law, because the annulment would not require the
recognition of the marriage but rather constitute an affirmation of its invalidity).
77. Faivre v. Faivre, 128 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956); see also Commonwealth
ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 279 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); LaVigne v. Wise, 43 Pa. D.
& C.4th 225 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Monroe County 1999).
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nevertheless have been recognized for federal tax purposes under the
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17.
B.

Possibility of Plural Marriage

Given the invalidity of this evasive marriage and Pennsylvania's
treatment of void marriages as nullities, it seems that nothing would
have prevented this couple from entering into additional marriages.
Two different scenarios come to mind in which the couple might have
wished to enter into additional marriages:
" Serial monogamy. If the Pennsylvania couple ended their
relationship following their New York marriage, they might
have relied on the invalidity of their first marriage to enter
into a later marriage (or marriages) with a new same-sex
partner(s). The couple might have done this because they
could not obtain a divorce from a Pennsylvania court, did not
wish to establish residency in New York for at least one year
to be able to divorce there, or did not want to incur the
significant expense of hiring a lawyer to test the legal waters
regarding the availability of an annulment in Pennsylvania. 8v
" Purposeful plural marriage. Or, if the couple were in an
"open" relationship, they might have decided to take
advantage of the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling
2013-17 by marrying other parties to the relationship, too.
From a federal tax perspective, there are a variety of reasons
why the couple might have done this. For instance, the couple
might have wished to expand the marital unit to include
additional parties to the relationship in order to be able to
transfer property among all of themselves free of tax-or
merely to avoid the uncertainties entailed with the sharing of
finances outside of a legally recognized marriage. v9
Alternatively, if both members of the married same-sex
couple had adequate health insurance from their employers
(i.e., neither one needed to be added as a spouse to the other's
insurance), they might have wished to marry other parties to
78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 2014); see supra note 76.
79. See supra note 13; see also Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as
Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 783 803 (2004) (describing the federal tax
uncertainties surrounding the sharing of finances by unmarried individuals).
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the relationship who had to pay for their own health insurance
in order to add them to their employer-provided coverage on
a tax-free basis.8"
It would have been possible for the same-sex couple to enter into
additional marriages because their New York marriage would have
been invalid both within and without Pennsylvania at that time. In
other words, it should have been as if the marriage never existed.
Thus, either or both of the same-sex spouses in this couple would
have been free to marry another person without the need for a
judicial declaration of annulment.8 For example, one spouse might
have gone to Maryland to enter into an evasive same-sex marriage
with a third Pennsylvania resident in early 2013,82 and the other
spouse might have gone to New Jersey to enter into an evasive samesex marriage with a fourth Pennsylvania resident later in 2013.83 Due
to the invalidity of the New York marriage, neither of these
subsequent same-sex marriages would have been bigamous at the
time they were entered into.84 Indeed, both the Maryland and New
Jersey marriages would have been invalid for the same reasons that
80. See supra note 14.
81. Cf Op. Att'y Gen. No. L-06 (N.D. 2013), available at 2013 WL 6593427 (opining
that a party to a valid same-sex marriage may legally enter into a different-sex marriage in
North Dakota without first dissolving the same-sex marriage and without risking criminal
prosecution; however, no opinion was expressed regarding the treatment of the differentsex marriage under the laws of the state where the same-sex marriage was entered into).
82. Maryland began to permit same-sex couples to marry on January 1, 2013. See Jean
Marbella, This Is Another Step in Being Treated Equally, BALT. SUN, Dec. 7, 2012, at 1A
(indicating that "Gov. Martin O'Malley officially confirmed the passage of the same-sex
marriage referendum" by the state's voters).
83. New Jersey began to permit same-sex couples to marry on October 21, 2013. See
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 369 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013)
(mandating that New Jersey extend the right to marry to same-sex couples); Salvador
Rizzo, Christie Ends Legal Battle Against Gay Marriage, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Oct. 22, 2013, at 1 (indicating that Governor Christie had decided not to appeal the
decision in Garden State Equality).
84. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-502(b) (LexisNexis 2012) ("While lawfully
married to a living person, a person may not enter into a marriage ceremony with
another."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1(a)(4) (West 2012) (stating that a married person is
not guilty of bigamy when he "reasonably believes that he is legally eligible to remarry");
Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975 76 (Md. 2012) (applying a rule similar to section 283(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for purposes of determining the validity of a
marriage); Wright v. State, 81 A.2d 602, 605 (Md. 1951) ("[I]t is a good defense to an
indictment for bigamy that the first marriage was void, since bigamy can be committed
only by the marriage of a person already married."); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65,
68 (N.J. 1958) (applying a rule similar to that of Pennsylvania with respect to evasive
marriages).
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the New York marriage was. 5 Accordingly, from a state law
perspective, none of these couples would have been considered
"married" at all, let alone married multiple times. Yet, under the
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, all three of
these marriages would have been recognized for federal tax purposes
because all that would matter under that interpretation would be
whether each marriage was permissible under the law of the place of
celebration-regardless of its actual validity. 6
At first blush, it might seem odd that the state of celebration in
each of these cases would be ignoring the prior marriage on the
ground that it was invalid but then would be allowing one of the
parties to that marriage to enter into another, similar marriage that
was likewise invalid. But it would only be odd if the state were
actually making a legal determination regarding the validity of these
marriages prior to issuing a license. In practice, little or no legal
vetting usually takes place before issuing a marriage license-a reality
that is leveraged here by having the marriages take place in three
different states. For example, when I emailed the New Jersey
Department of Health to determine whether any legal vetting takes
place in that state, I received the following response: "The local
Registrars do not check any records to verify previous marriages
when they take an application. The applicants sign the application to
verify that they have provided honest and accurate information. They
are liable if they [sic] information is fraudulent." 7 Questions about
85. See supra note 844 and Part II.A.
86. It might also have been possible for each of the parties to the New York same-sex
marriage to enter into a single different-sex marriage without running afoul of criminal
prohibitions against bigamy or polygamy. See supra note 811.
87. E-mail from records@doh.state.nj.us, to Anthony C. Infanti, Senior Assoc. Dean
for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Jan. 6, 2014,
08:34 AM EST) (on file with author); see E-mail from Guy R. Warner, N.Y. State
Registrar, Dir., Vital Records, to Anthony C. Infanti, Senior Assoc. Dean for Academic
Affairs & Professor of Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Jan. 6, 2014, 09:18 AM EST)
("Marriage licenses are issued by local municipal clerks. They do not check records of
marriages, deaths, etc. before issuing the license.") (on file with author); see also Bride
Accused of Stealing Dead Woman's ID, NEWS JOURNAL (Wilmington, Del.), Dec. 6, 2007,
at B3 (reporting that a individual used deceased relative's identification to marry in
Delaware, likely because the state reportedly performs no records check prior to issuing a
marriage license); Susannah Cahalan & David Seifman, I.D.-Thief Wedding Crushers:
Forgery Nightmare Turns Brides into "Bigamists," N.Y. POST, Aug. 26, 2007, at 5
(describing how individuals were denied marriage licenses on the ground that they were
already married in the state (in some cases multiple times), when the earlier marriages
were fraudulently entered into by individuals who had stolen their identities); David
Doege, Woman Pleads Guilty to Identity Theft, Bigamy Using Aunt's Name, MILWAUKEE
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the validity of a marriage are thus normally left to be sorted out
sometime after the wedding day (hence many of the cases cited in this
essay).
Thus, whether our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple
entered into multiple marriages with the purpose of achieving legal
recognition for an open relationship under the federal tax laws or
merely to memorialize their serial monogamy, the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 would seem to treat the
marriages the same. That is, all three of these marriages would be
recognized for federal tax purposes and, in turn, our four
Pennsylvania residents would be federally recognized bigamists or
polygamists. Accordingly, the parties to these marriages would have
been required to file plural joint federal income tax returns-a
practically difficult task given that the joint return is designed to be
filed only by those in dyadic marriages-or, if all of the parties were
not agreeable to filing jointly (which is highly probable in the serial
monogamy scenario), they would have been required to use the
generally disadvantageous married filing separately status on their
returns.8 8
C. Ramifications of Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage
On May 20, 2014, a federal district court issued a decision
striking down the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act on
constitutional grounds-a decision with immediate effect that the
Governor of Pennsylvania chose not to appeal. 9 Because at least one
set of plaintiffs in the case had entered into an evasive marriage, 9° the
court's ruling clearly addressed the legal treatment of same-sex
marriages previously entered into outside of Pennsylvania and
specifically conferred legal recognition on those relationships. 9' This
legal development raises further interesting questions and issues
regarding the interaction of state and federal law for couples who
enter into multiple marriages, whether of the purposefully plural or

JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2002, at B5 (reporting that one woman married two different
men within months using two different identities).
88. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (d), 6013 (West 2012). For a description of the disadvantages of
married filing separately status, see Infanti, supra note 7, at 122 23.
89. See supra note 44.
90. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
91. Id. at 413 ("By virtue of this ruling, same-sex couples who seek to marry in
Pennsylvania may do so, and already married same-sex couples will be recognized as such
in the Commonwealth.").
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the serially monogamous variety. Again, the discussion of the legal
treatment of these marriages will be discussed first for federal tax
purposes under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling
2013-17 and then under state law.
1. Federal Tax Treatment
Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17,
the court's decision should have been a nonevent for federal tax
purposes. Under that interpretation, all that matters from a federal
tax perspective is whether the state where a same-sex couple was
married permitted same-sex marriages at the time. 92 Because all three
of the states where the marriages posited in our example took place
(i.e., New York, New Jersey, and Maryland) permitted same-sex
couples to marry when the marriages were entered into,93 all three of
these same-sex marriages should have been, and should continue to
be, "valid" and recognized for federal tax purposes under the
alternative interpretation.
2. State Law Treatment
From a state law perspective, however, the retroactive
application of the federal court decision could give rise to difficult
legal issues. If all of these marriages were now retroactively afforded
legal recognition, then Pennsylvania would now, too, see these
individuals as having entered into multiple marriages. As a result,
some or all of these four individuals might have committed the crime
of bigamy. 94 There is, however, a defense to bigamy in Pennsylvania
for those who enter into a subsequent marriage in good faith, which
might protect the parties to these marriages from criminal
prosecution. 95 Nevertheless, a deliberate attempt to enter into
multiple marriages to take advantage of the gap that the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 creates between federal tax
law and state family law (as occurred in the purposefully plural
marriage scenario) might be seen as evidence of bad faith that would
negate such a defense.

92. See supra Part I.
93. See supra notes 46, 82, 83 and accompanying text.
94. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4301 (West 2014). Whether the other parties to the
second and third marriages are guilty of bigamy would depend on their knowledge of the
hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple's first (i.e., New York) marriage. Id. § 4301(b).
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(c).
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In terms of the legal validity of the multiple marriages posited in
our example, the legal treatment under Pennsylvania law diverges
significantly from the federal tax treatment under the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. In keeping with its
criminalization of bigamy, Pennsylvania permits only one marriage to
be legally recognized at a time. 96 Depending on the facts and
circumstances, the Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be
retroactively void as bigamous, leaving only the New York marriage
valid. 97 Alternatively, under appropriate facts and circumstances, the
Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be legally recognized over
the New York marriage. 98 But recall that if the validity of a marriage
under the law of the state of domicile is irrelevant under Revenue
Ruling 2013-17, as proponents of the alternative interpretation hold,
then the invalidation of any of these marriages under Pennsylvania
law should not affect their recognition for federal tax purposes. Thus,
parties to multiple marriages-whether those marriages are
purposefully plural or merely serially monogamous-could (or
should) continue to file plural joint federal income tax returns-or be
relegated to the disadvantageous married filing separately statusfollowing the federal court decision striking down the Pennsylvania
defense of marriage act.99
If our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple were serially
monogamous (rather than purposefully plural) in their marriages,
then they might actually wish for the subsequent Maryland and New
Jersey marriages to remain valid (rather than the initial New York
marriage). A Pennsylvania statute could provide them with a partial
remedy in this situation if the New York marriage is the only one that
is otherwise to be legally recognized. That statute provides in
pertinent part:
If a married person, during the lifetime of the other person with
whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent
96. See infra note 100.
97. See In re Estate of Watt, 185 A.2d 781, 784 86 (Pa. 1962) (setting up a facts and
circumstances test for determining which marriage will be legally recognized that stems
from the need to resolve conflicting presumptions regarding (1) the continuance of the
first marriage and (2) the innocence of the parties entering into the second marriage);
Huff v. Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 40 F.3d 35, 39-42 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Estate
of Watt).
98. See, e.g., Huff, 40 F.3d at 42 43 (describing the possibility that the second
marriage in that case might be recognized over the first and remanding the case to the
district court to weigh the facts and circumstances).
99. See supra note 888 and accompanying text.
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marriage ... and the subsequent marriage was entered into by
one or both of the parties in good faith in the full belief that the
former spouse was dead or that the former marriage has been
annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge of
the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their
marriage has been removed by the death of the other party to
the former marriage or by annulment or divorce, if they
continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on
the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married
from and immediately after the date of death or the date of the
decree of annulment or divorce.'
This statute provides only a partial remedy because the
subsequent Maryland and New Jersey marriages could not be
retroactively validated from their inception; rather, they would be
valid only from the date the New York marriage ended through
divorce or annulment. It would seem that, even under the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the formal divorce or
annulment of the first marriage should end its recognition for federal
tax purposes-coincidentally, as of the same time the marriage would
cease to be legally recognized under state law. However, as
mentioned above, under the alternative interpretation, the Maryland
and New Jersey marriages would have been recognized for federal tax
purposes from the date of their celebration-and not just from the
time the New York marriage ended through divorce or annulmentcreating yet further discontinuity between the federal tax and state
law treatment of the same marriages.
D. Not Just a PennsylvaniaProblem
This opportunity
for
purposeful
legal
arbitrage-or,
alternatively, to inadvertently fall into a trap of legal complexity-is
not unique to Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is not the only state that
has prohibited same-sex marriage, that has adopted rules similar to
those in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws for determining the
validity of marriages, and whose laws would allow same-sex couples
to avoid criminal bigamy or polygamy charges because their
relationships are legally invalid. Other states in an ostensibly similar

100. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West 2014).
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Kentucky,0 4

101. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 ("Marriage consists only of the union of one man
and one woman."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201(b) (2014) (providing that a reasonable
belief that one is eligible to marry is an affirmative defense to a charge of bigamy); id. § 911-107 (refusing to treat as valid migratory same-sex marriages); id. § 9-11-109 ("A
marriage between persons of the same sex is void."); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 550
(Ark. 1957) ("In the circumstances, it can hardly be said that the public policy of this State
against under-age marriages is so strong that such a marriage, valid in the state where it
was contracted, is void in this State."); Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark.
1986) (reaffirming Graves and stating, "We have no doubt that the Arkansas policy
against incest is so strong that we would not recognize the validity of a marriage, even if
performed in another state, between very close blood relatives, such as a father and
daughter or a brother and sister."). But see Max Brantley, Arkansas Supreme Court Stays
Ruling OverturningSame-Sex MarriageBan, ARK. TIMES ARK. BLOG (May 16, 2014, 4:31
PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/05/16/arkansas-supreme-court
-stays-ruling-overturning-same-sex-marriage-ban (reporting that one week after a decision
by a state trial court judge striking down the state's defense of marriage act on
constitutional grounds, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued a stay of that decision pending
appeal).
102. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1(a) (Westlaw 2014) ("Marriages between
persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20(b) (2013)
(providing that a reasonable belief that an individual is eligible to remarry is a defense to
bigamy); id. § 19-3-3.1(b) ("Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise
shall be void in this state."); id. § 19-3-43 ("Parties residing in this state may not evade any
of the laws of this state as to marriage by going into another state for the solemnization of
the marriage ceremony."); King v. State, 40 Ga. 244, 247 (1869) ("If the first marriage
were, for any cause, void, or if the defendant has been divorced a vinculo matrimonii, the
second marriage is not bigamy."); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wacht, 66 S.E.2d 757, 757 59
(Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (finding no intent to evade marriage laws where a woman moved to
another state, met a man there, married there, and remained there for several years before
returning to Georgia).
103. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1(b) (West 2013) ("A marriage between persons of
the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is
solemnized."); id. § 31-11-8-6 (rendering evasive marriages void); id. § 35-46-1-2(b)
(providing that a reasonable belief that an individual is eligible to remarry is a defense to
bigamy); Pry v. Pry, 75 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. 1947) (stating that " 'a void marriage is good
for no legal purpose' " and indicating that there is no need to bring an action to declare a
marriage void (quoting Wiley v. Wiley, 123 N.E. 252, 254 (1919)). But see Baskin v. Bogan,
No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 2884868, at *16 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014), affd,
2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (striking down Indiana's same-sex marriage ban
as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution);
Rick Callahan, Gay Marriage Ruling Put on Hold, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 16, 2014, at A5
(indicating that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had issued a stay of its ruling
pending appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court).
104. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (West 2014) (deeming same-sex marriages
"prohibited and void"); id. § 402.040 (adopting a place of celebration rule for determining
the validity of foreign marriages unless they are against public policy in Kentucky and
specifying that same-sex marriages are against public policy); id. § 402.045 (declaring
foreign same-sex marriages void in Kentucky); id. § 530.010(2) (providing that a
reasonable belief that one is eligible to marry is a defense to a charge of bigamy); id. cmt.
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North Dakota, 5 and Virginia.0 6 Thus, if the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 proves correct, then there
are several other states whose laws appear to allow individuals to
enter into plural marriages for federal tax purposes, whether
purposefully or inadvertently.
III. A FLAWED INTERPRETATION

Adopting the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 201317 might thus result in a profound reworking of the federal tax
(indicating in appended commentary from the Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC, which
is intended as an aid in construing the statute, id. § 500.100, that this reasonable belief
defense aims to cover, among others, the situation where "the prior marriage was void").
But see Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (finding in a
memorandum opinion that Kentucky's constitutional amendment and statutes prohibiting
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied
to same-sex couples who entered into apparently evasive marriages in jurisdictions outside
of Kentucky; unfortunately, the court's reasoning was conceptually muddied by its
assumption, without explanation or analysis, that these evasive marriages are in fact
valid-like the IRS in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the court did not seem to appreciate the
different categories of marriages that exist or the choice-of-law issues raised by evasive
marriages and the impact of those issues on the constitutional analysis in the opinion);
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (striking down the state same-sex
marriage ban as it applies to couples wishing to marry in Kentucky, but issuing a stay of
that decision); John Cheves, Federal Judge Grants Indefinite Delay of His Same-Sex
MarriageRuling in Kentucky, KENTUCKY.COM (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.kentucky.com
/2014/03/19/3149077/federal-judge-grants-indefinite.html (granting stay of the decision in
Bourke).
105. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13(1) (2012) (criminalizing a marriage to
"another person, while married to another person"); id. § 14-03-08 (determining validity of
an evasive marriage by reference to North Dakota law); Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d
8, 13 (N.D. 1960) (same); see also supra note 811.
106. See VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A ("That only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions."); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-363, -364 (2014) (providing an exception to the
crime of bigamy for a person "whose former marriage was void"); id. § 20-45.2 ("Any
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be
void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be
void and unenforceable."); Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) ("A
marriage that is valid under the law of the state or country where it is celebrated is valid in
Virginia, unless it is repugnant to public policy."); Kleinfield v. Varuki, 372 S.E.2d 407, 409
(Va. Ct. App. 1988) ("A void marriage, unlike a voidable marriage, does not require an
action of annulment to render it void. Without obtaining an annulment, a party to a void
marriage is free to marry again."). But see Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D.
Va. 2014), affid sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014)
(striking down on summary judgment Virginia's same-sex marriage ban under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution). The Supreme Court has
issued a stay of this decision. McQuigg v. Bostic, No. 14A196, 2014 WL 4096232 (U.S.
Aug. 20, 2014).
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treatment of intimate relationships. To be clear, I express no opinion
here regarding whether plural marriage ought to be recognized for
federal tax purposes. Rather, I am merely observing that adopting an
interpretation that would lead to the recognition of plural marriage
would represent a sea change in the tax treatment of intimate
relationships. In this Part, I articulate the reasons why such a sea
change in the tax treatment of intimate relationships is unlikely to
withstand scrutiny and why it would do no more than add to the
uncertainty that continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex
couples post-Windsor.
A.

ContradictoryPositions

The alternative interpretation would cause the IRS to espouse
contradictory positions-in the same ruling-that both reify and
undermine the importance of marriage in its conventional, dyadic
form. Although Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not without its internal
contradictions,' these two positions stand in such stark contrast that
they call into question the alternative interpretation's plausibility.
Reifying the importance of "marriage," Revenue Ruling 2013-17
takes a rigidly formalistic approach in determining which conjugal
relationships qualify as "marriages" for federal tax purposes. In that
ruling, the IRS-without any explanation or justification-announced
that it would not treat same-sex or different-sex couples in civil unions
or domestic partnerships as "married" for federal tax purposes.0 8
This position came as a surprise because, just two years earlier, the
IRS indicated its willingness to look past labels and to treat differentsex couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships as "married" for
federal tax purposes so long as their legal relationships were
equivalent to marriage under state law.0 9 The IRS's newly rigid
attachment to the label "marriage" effectively closes the door to

107. Infanti, supra note 7, at 124.
108. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204; see Infanti, supra note 7, at 123 25
(explaining the reversal of position).
109. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, Internal Revenue
Serv., to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), available at 2011
TNT 215-62 (LEXIS) ("[1]f Illinois treats the parties to an Illinois civil union who are of
opposite sex as husband and wife, they are considered 'husband and wife' for purposes of
Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code, and are not precluded from filing jointly,
unless prohibited by other exceptions under the Code.").
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recognizing alternative forms of relationships for federal tax
purposes."'
Yet, embracing the alternative interpretation would undermine
the importance of "marriage" in its conventional sense by opening the
door to plural marriage. This would represent a radical departure
from extant social norms concerning marriage, as expressed in state
criminal prohibitions against bigamy."' Furthermore, in contrast to its
position regarding civil unions and domestic partnerships, the IRS
takes no explicit position on evasive (and, correlatively, plural)
marriages in the ruling; rather, that position has only been inferred by
commentators. 112 It is doubtful that a sea change in the legal
treatment of intimate relationships would come about by implication,
especially given the IRS's professed goal of providing certainty,
clarity, and cohesive guidance to same-sex couples. 113 Moreover, it
would be quite odd for the same ruling, on the one hand, to
purposefully close the door to recognizing alternatives to
conventional, dyadic marriage that already exist under state law and,
on the other, to implicitly embrace an alternative to dyadic marriage
that does not yet exist under state law (and that would not be
correlatively recognized under state law following the fall of the
individual state bans on same-sex marriage)." 4
B.

Too Far,Too Fast

Compounding the oddity of this juxtaposition of contradictory
positions is the tax system's complete lack of preparedness to deal
with plural marriage. As mentioned above, I express no opinion here
regarding the propriety of legally recognizing plural marriage. My
purpose is far more modest-that is, to observe that the IRS could
not legally recognize plural marriage without making changes to the
tax system to accommodate the differences between dyadic and plural
marriage. No such changes accompanied the issuance of Revenue
Ruling 2013-17."' This calls into question whether the IRS had the
alternative interpretation in mind when drafting the ruling or, if it did,

110. Infanti, supra note 7, at 127.
111. See, e.g., supra notes 84 1066.
112. See, e.g., supra notes 321 322.
113. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., supra Part II.C.
115. Hence, the reference above to the practical difficulty of filing plural joint tax
returns. See supra text accompanying note 888.
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whether it actually considered or understood the consequences of that
position.
Through the Code, Congress imposes a federal income tax that
applies at the national level; however, it is important to remember
that the Code "taxes transactions whose legal effects are usually
prescribed by state rather than federal law.""' 6 As a result, state family
law underpins the federal tax treatment of intimate relationships." 7
But this underpinning falls short when it comes to plural marriage.
Because plural marriage remains criminalized, commentators have
not focused their energies on creating or refining a legal regime for its
regulation."' To fill this gap, Adrienne Davis has considered what a
regime for recognition and regulation of plural marriage might look
like." 9 According to Professor Davis, family law is not equipped to
deal with plural marriage and the ways in which it differs from dyadic
marriage. 121 Instead, Professor Davis suggests that commercial
partnership law could serve as a useful starting point for developing a
regulatory framework for plural marriage. 12' Regardless, because
family law is currently unequipped to deal with plural marriage, the
Code lacks an underlying legal framework to which it can attach tax
consequences.
Tax law is in no better position than family law to deal with
plural marriage. As Samuel Brunson has observed, "tax law.., has
no mechanism for dealing with polygamous taxpayers.' 1 22 The
qualitative and quantitative differences between dyadic and plural
marriage render our extant joint filing system, which treats the dyadic
married couple as a taxable unit, ill-suited to the task of appropriately
taxing plural marriages. 123 Indeed, citing the difficulties of taxing
116. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 4.1.1 (2014) (emphasis added), availableat 1997 WL 439503 *1.
117. Id. ("Without the body of state law prescribing the rights and liabilities arising
from taxpayers' daily activities, the federal tax collector would be a fish out of water....
[T]he Code's reliance on state law is so pervasive that it rarely rises to the conscious
level.").
118. Davis, supra note 3, at 1957 60.
119. Id. at 1958.
120. Id. at 1959. On the qualitative differences between dyadic and plural marriage,
Professor Davis explains that "[p]olygamy's defining feature marital multiplicity
generates specific costs and vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities for exploitative and
opportunistic behavior.... (Of course, for some, multiplicity also generates upsides ....
Id. at 1958; see id. at 1989 95 (providing further detail).
121. Id. at 2002 32.
122. Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 116 (2013).
123. Id. at 145-61, 167 68.
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plural marriage, Professor Brunson has added124 his voice to those
calling for a switch to an individual filing system.
Of course, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 cannot address the lack of an
underlying family law framework for dealing with plural marriage.
Nor, for that matter, does it address the lack of a tax law framework
for dealing with plural marriage. Had it done so, the IRS would have
gone well beyond interpreting the Code. Adopting the alternative
interpretation would therefore move the tax laws too far, too fastentering into uncharted territory that Congress and the states need to
map before the IRS can address the tax treatment of plural marriage.
C.

Validity of the Alternative Interpretation

The previous two sections make it clear that the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is both implausible and
inadvisable because it opens the door to plural marriage. In response
to these arguments, proponents of that interpretation might argue
that the IRS never intended to legally recognize plural marriages, as
evidenced by the lack of any mention of plural marriage in the ruling.
But the same could be said of evasive marriages-the ruling makes no
mention of this category of marriages either. 125 Nonetheless,
proponents of the alternative interpretation assert that the IRS must
have intended to cover evasive marriages in its guidance. 126 Such a
conflicted interpretation of the ruling-reading coverage of one
unmentioned type of marriage into the ruling while reading another
unmentioned type of marriage out of the ruling-would be wholly
untethered from the text. Far beyond mere interpretation, this would
amount to a rewriting of the ruling-one that undermines the promise
that the ruling would provide same-sex couples with certainty, clarity,
and coherent guidance regarding their tax treatment. 127
As a fallback, proponents of the alternative interpretation might
argue that the IRS had only dyadic marriage in mind when it drafted
Revenue Ruling 2013-17. This argument is no better because it only
draws attention to questions regarding the validity of the alternative
interpretation. As described above, the alternative interpretation's
treatment of evasive marriages creates what is, in essence, a federal
law of marriage that stands apart from state law by overriding
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 149, 161-68.
See supra Part I.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See Lowrey, supra note 8.
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applicable state laws regarding the validity of marriages. To argue
that couples who enter into these marriages may only have a single,
dyadic marriage recognized for federal tax purposes-when these
couples might, in fact, enter into a series of dyadic same-sex marriages
because each of the dyadic marriages is void under state law-would
merely impose a federal restriction on a category of federal tax
marriages.
If the IRS were to embrace the alternative interpretation,
taxpayers would very likely challenge it. These challenges could come
from same-sex couples wishing to enter into plural tax marriages (if
the IRS refuses them recognition), serially monogamous same-sex
couples who wish to be freed from adverse consequences of the
alternative interpretation, or, as I have explained elsewhere, from
same-sex couples in evasive marriages that have broken down and
who now find themselves trapped indefinitely in the highly
disadvantageous married filing separately tax status because they are
128
unable to sever their marital relationship under state or federal law.
As discussed below, when challenged, the alternative interpretation is
unlikely to withstand scrutiny because of a combination of its
implausibility, its inadvisability, and its creation of a federal tax law of
marriage. Both litigation challenging the alternative interpretation
and any ruling striking down that interpretation would serve only to
darken the cloud of tax uncertainty hanging over same-sex couples
129
post-Windsor.
1. Deference to Revenue Rulings
According to the Treasury Regulations, "La] Revenue Ruling is
an official interpretation by the [IRS] that has been published in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings... are published for the
information and guidance of taxpayers, [IRS] officials, and others
concerned.' 13 ' The purpose of publishing revenue rulings is "to
promote correct and uniform application of the tax laws by [IRS]
employees and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary
compliance by informing [IRS] personnel and the public of National
Office interpretations.' 13' Although it is intended that taxpayers will

128. Infanti, supra note 7, at 122 23.
129. E.g., id. at 120 22.
130. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as amended in 1987); see Rev. Proc. 89-14, 19891 C.B. 814.
131. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1987).
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rely upon revenue rulings in determining their tax liability, revenue
rulings "do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department
Regulations. "132
It is unclear precisely what level of deference, if any, should be
afforded to revenue rulings. Conventional wisdom holds that the high
level of deference afforded to agency action under Chevron, USA,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. 133 is inappropriate for
revenue rulings and that the lower level of deference afforded under
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.134 is more appropriate. 135 In contrast, Kristin
Hickman has argued that revenue rulings are eligible for Chevron
deference because they can trigger the imposition of penalties and,
therefore, have the force of law. 136 However, Professor Hickman has
further argued that courts should nonetheless invalidate revenue
rulings because the IRS issues them without satisfying the notice-and137
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Accepting Professor Hickman's analysis, Revenue Ruling 201317 should be invalidated in its entirety because the IRS failed to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing the
ruling. As discussed below, even following the conventional wisdom
and applying Skidmore deference, the alternative interpretation
should still be afforded no deference and should be rejected.
Whichever approach is taken, the result will be to compound the
uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples postWindsor.

132. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (e).
133. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 43 (holding that when a statute is silent or ambiguous on
the question to be addressed, the court will not impose its own construction of the statute
if the agency has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140 (holding that administrative "rulings, interpretations and opinions.., while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance");
Leandra Lederman, The Fight over "Fighting Regs" and Judicial Deference in Tax
Litigation,92 B.U. L. REV. 643,664-68 (2012).
136. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpackingthe Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 502 09,
526 29 (2013).
137. Brief of Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 30 34, United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1395 (2014) (No. 12-1408),
2013 WL 6114794. Professor Hickman has argued that the exceptions to the notice-andcomment requirement are generally inapplicable to revenue rulings. Id. at 28-30.
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2. Skidmore Analysis
Under Skidmore, agency interpretations that are
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to
138
persuade, if lacking power to control.
More recently, the Supreme Court, citing Skidmore, stated that
"[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own
statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts
have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency,
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the
agency's position. "139 Professor Hickman, writing with Matthew
Krueger, has helpfully suggested that these factors should be
balanced with the overarching goals of Skidmore in mind; namely,
"Skidmore's factors should.., be understood as ferreting out two
things: first, the extent to which agencies have deliberately employed
their superior expertise and resources in evaluating the statutory
ambiguity at hand; and second, the potential for arbitrariness in
agency action."' 40
Bearing this in mind, the alternative interpretation of Revenue
Ruling 2013-17 should be afforded no deference under Skidmore
because it smacks more of arbitrariness than of a reasoned
application of agency expertise. It cannot be argued that the
alternative
interpretation
demonstrates
thoroughness
of
consideration or a high degree of care on the part of the IRS. As
discussed above, it is unclear whether the IRS intended to cover
evasive marriages in the ruling or even whether the IRS understood
that this category of marriages exists at all.' 4 ' How can the IRS be said
to have engaged in a reasoned application of its expertise with regard
to a position that was not clearly articulated and, to date, has only
been inferred by commentators and others interpreting ambiguous
138. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
139. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
140. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1294 (2007).
141. See supra notes 22-43 and accompanying text.
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language in the ruling? This is an especially difficult task when, in
stark contrast, the IRS clearly articulated its position regarding
migratory marriages, took care in explaining that position, and
provided a reasoned justification of its choice of a place of celebration
rule on administrability grounds. 4 2
The alternative interpretation also lacks any claim to consistency
with earlier IRS pronouncements. The IRS cites its earlier position in
Revenue Ruling 58-66 as evidence of a consistent position regarding
the determination of a marriage's validity for federal tax purposes;
however, as explained above, Revenue Ruling 58-66 did not address
the treatment of evasive marriages. 43 Rather, it does no more than
lend support to the argument that the IRS has taken a consistent
approach in dealing with the separate question of how to determine
the validity of migratory marriages.'44
Finally, the alternative interpretation lacks the power of
persuasion. As discussed above, the alternative interpretation
essentially creates a federal tax law of marriage-a law that would
15
embrace the recognition of plural marriage for federal tax purposes.
Aside from an anomalous Second Circuit decision concerning the
validity of an ex parte divorce (which the IRS has declined to
follow), 14 6 the IRS and the courts have consistently taken the view
that, for federal tax purposes, questions of marital status are
determined under state law. 4 v Indeed, in specifically rejecting the
142. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203 04.
143. See supra notes 29 32 and accompanying text.
144. Even that support may be tenuous, as one appellate court found that the IRS had
taken a position contrary to the one announced in Revenue Ruling 58-66 in the context of
determining the validity of an ex parte divorce. Estate of Borax v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 666,
675 (2d Cir. 1965); Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65, 65 (declining to follow Estate of
Borax).
145. See supra Part II.
146. Estate of Borax, 349 F.2d 666; Rev. Rul. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65, 65 (declining to
follow Estate of Borax).
147. Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) ("We agree with the
government's argument that under the Internal Revenue Code a federal court is bound by
state law rather than federal law when attempting to construe marital status."); Estate of
Steffke, 538 F.2d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1976) ("No one argues that Congress intended to
create a body of federal marital law wholly independent from state law. The real issue
which this court must decide in the present case is not whether to apply state or federal
law; it rather must decide which jurisdiction's law should be recognized where a judgment
of one jurisdiction is adjudged to be without validity in the controlling taxation jurisdiction
although concededly the first judgment would have been recognized and sustained in
other jurisdictions."); Von Tersch v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) ("For the purpose of
establishing eligibility to file a joint Federal income tax return, the marital status of the
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Second Circuit's position, the Ninth Circuit emphasized some of the
problems associated with adopting a federal tax law of marriage:
To provide a federal tax law of marriage would create greater
confusion in divorce courts than now exists. Some individuals
would be validly married for all purposes except federal taxes,
and others validly married for federal tax purposes only.
Marriage is peculiarly a creature of state law and we
reaffirm ... that state law governs.' 48
As the discussion in Part 11 above amply demonstrates, the Ninth
Circuit was, if anything, understating the potential problems and
confusion created by a federal tax law of marriage. Under the
alternative interpretation, marriages could be recognized for federal
tax purposes when actually void under state law. Because of the
invalidity of these marriages under state law, additional marriages
could then be entered into for federal tax purposes, whether
purposefully or inadvertently. When the relevant state ban on samesex marriage eventually falls, all of these marriages might then be
recognized under state law as well, but either the additional marriages
or the first marriage would likely be invalidated under state law to
avoid a bigamous result-even though there might not be a
corresponding termination of the marriage for federal tax purposes
(or, if there is, the periods during which the various marriages would
be legally recognized under state law might not match the periods
during which those same marriages would be legally recognized for
federal tax purposes). Furthermore, those taking advantage of this
novel federal tax law of marriage might actually risk criminal
prosecution for bigamy under state law following the fall of the state
ban on same-sex marriage.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's observation that "[m]arriage is
peculiarly a creature of state law"' 4 9 highlights an additional problem
with the alternative interpretation-namely, the federalism concerns
that it raises. The alternative interpretation would create a federal tax
two individuals is to be determined under the laws of the State of their residence."); Rev.
Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 CB. 40, 40-41 (finding that, where a state court annulled a marriage
and held that no valid marriage ever existed, the couple must file as single individuals for
the year of the annulment and file amended returns for prior years); see BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 1166, 111.3.6 ("There being no federal law of marriage and divorce
(except in the District of Columbia), the marital status of taxpayers is usually governed by
local law.").
148. Lee v. Comm'r, 550 F.2d 1201, 1202 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
149. Id.
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law of marriage that is both independent of and, by recognizing plural
marriage, moves far beyond state marriage laws. The majority in
United States v. Windsor was suspicious of DOMA's uniform federal
definition of marriage because it flatly denied recognition to
marriages that were valid under state law. 5 ' Of course, the alternative
interpretation is not motivated by anti-gay animus in the way that
DOMA was. 5' But, in the case of evasive marriages, the alternative
interpretation would directly interfere with a state's ability to
determine the circumstances under which its own residents may
marry, just as DOMA did. 5 2 Courts may eventually declare individual
(and hopefully, all) state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional;
however, it is beyond the IRS's authority to circumvent the legal
process for reaching these decisions by creating a federal tax law of
marriage that overrides and overleaps state law.
Unfortunately, a concomitant of these federalism concerns is
tangible harm to same-sex couples. As I have explained elsewhere,
same-sex couples would be adversely affected by the alternative
interpretation if they find themselves trapped in a federal tax
marriage with no way out after the relationship breaks down or when
they are forced to deal with the complexities (and increased risk of
audit) stemming from inconsistent federal and state tax treatment of
their relationships while those relationships remain intact. 53 The
alternative interpretation would also exacerbate class-based
inequities within states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage, as
only those with the means to "evade" same-sex marriage bans would
have access to marriage for federal tax purposes. 15 Furthermore, as
mentioned above, if plural marriage were recognized for federal tax
purposes, the alternative interpretation could expose the parties to
marriages intended to take advantage of plural marriage to criminal
sanctions under state law when the relevant state bans on same-sex
marriage are repealed or declared unconstitutional and legal
recognition is applied retroactively.
For all of these reasons, courts would owe no deference to the
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. Indeed, given
its lack of persuasive power, courts entertaining challenges to the

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 93 (2013).
Id. at 2693 95.
Id. at 2693 94.
Infanti, supra note 7, at 122 23, 125 26.
Id. at 120.
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alternative interpretation would likely reject it. While legal challenges
to the alternative interpretation were pending, the level of
uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples would
naturally rise. Following the invalidation of the alternative
interpretation, that uncertainty level would remain high because
same-sex couples in evasive marriages would return to the status quo
pre-Windsor, when the courts and the IRS provided same-sex couples
essentially no guidance on the tax treatment of their relationships.'5 5
As I have explained elsewhere, deferring to state choice-of-law
rules on questions of marital status is no panacea either, because that
would have its own set of negative impacts on same-sex couples.'56
The point of my work in this area is not to advocate one or another
set of rules that privilege certain marriages over others for federal tax
purposes. Instead, the point of my work is to demonstrate the
complexities and problems entailed by the choice in the tax laws to
privilege one form of relationship (i.e., marriage) over all others. The
problems entailed by this choice have long been known to tax
academics.' 57 The evolving legal landscape for recognizing same-sex
relationships simply provides an opportunity to make these problems
salient to a wider audience. Hopefully, we can seize this opportunity
to move away from a discussion of how best to bring same-sex
couples into the privileged fold of marriage and toward a
conversation about how to achieve a tax system that respects all
relationships equally. 5 '
CONCLUSION

Revenue Ruling 2013-17 has failed to deliver on the promise to
same-sex couples of "certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing
guidance."' 5 9 The ruling does not address-nor does it seem to fully
appreciate-the complexities created by the intersection of mobility
with the patchwork of state relationship recognition laws. Resulting
ambiguity in the ruling has created the space for commentators to
offer an interpretation of this ruling that would immediately expand
the number of same-sex couples who could be treated as married for
155. Id. at 116 17.
156. Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Families, Tax Nothings, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
35, 64 68 (2014).
157. See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for
Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 614 18.
158. Infanti, supra note 7, at 128 29.
159. Lowrey, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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federal tax purposes far beyond those married and residing in (or who
formerly resided in) states that permit same-sex couples to marry.
In addition to having potential negative effects on same-sex
couples, this interpretation would open the door to legally
recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes. From all
appearances, it seems that this door was inadvertently left ajar rather
than purposefully held open. The failure of the alternative
interpretation to demonstrate any power to persuade is testament to
the accidental nature of this radical expansion of marriage's
privileged circle. However salutary it might be to expand the legal
recognition of same-sex relationships and to break the hold that
conventional marriage has had on the federal tax laws, the alternative
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not the appropriate
means of accomplishing these ends.

